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Abstract
The role of competition in healthcare is much debated.  Despite a wealth of international experience in relation 
to competition, evidence is mixed and contested and the debate about the potential role for competition is often 
polarised. This paper considers briefly some of the reasons for this, focusing on what is meant by “competition 
in healthcare” and why it is more valuable to think about the circumstances in which competition is more and 
less likely to be a good tool to achieve benefits, rather than whether or not it is “good” or “bad,” per se.
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The organisation of healthcare has been a subject of debate for a very long time. There are many facets to the debate but one of the most intensely argued is the 
appropriate role of competition in healthcare markets. Claims 
are made at each end of the spectrum: some see competition 
as having no place in services aimed at protecting the sick1; 
and others that competition is the antidote for bloated, 
inefficient services and even “saves lives.”2,3 Given both 
the variety of models operating between countries and also 
the regular changes that occur within countries where 
competitive forces are at times in favour and other times 
not, it is perhaps surprising that we do not appear to have 
sufficient evidence from comparison of different practices, to 
settle this debate. There are at least 2 reasons for this: first, 
“competition in healthcare” is a broad term that does not 
capture adequately the many variations and meanings of the 
term; second, even when defined carefully, evaluation of the 
impact of competition is far from straightforward. I consider 
these points further below.
From a simple economics perspective, a competitive market is 
one in which buyers and sellers come together in an exchange 
relationship and if this were a “perfect” market, exhibiting 
certain characteristics, theory would predict that this would 
deliver the best possible outcomes for both buyers and sellers. 
In reality, even the keenest proponents of competition are 
unlikely to argue that the restrictive conditions under which 
such outcomes are achieved, will exist in healthcare markets 
which are characterised by serious imperfections or “failures” 
(such as buyers inability to determine quality), and thus it 
has long been held4 that healthcare almost everywhere, is 
provided in the context of regulated markets, sometimes called 
“quasi-markets.” Therefore, the debate is about the degree of 
competition, as well as the degree of regulation (from central, 
federal, regional, or local governments), that will produce the 
best outcomes, rather than between competition versus no 
competition. 
All too often, arguments are blurred by the tendency to 
equate competition with the private sector/privatisation and 
lack of competition with the public sector. Things become 
even more muddled when the financing and delivery of 
healthcare are not considered separately. There are many 
ways of analysing the role of competition but starting with 
financing, whilst many systems have insurance coverage 
provided by a national, local or common insurer (single-
payer system), some healthcare systems operate with multiple 
and competing insurers, even where such insurance is 
compulsory. In some cases, for instance The Netherlands and 
Switzerland, the degree of actual competition is tempered 
by government regulation; and in others, although there are 
multiple insurers in operation, affiliation to one of these is 
not a matter of individual choice, but is determined by other 
factors such as professional status. The United States is 
notable in terms of operating a competitive insurance market 
(outside of Medicare and Medicaid), but there is also a small 
number of other countries which allow insurers to compete 
for the business of citizens, with some countries having 
more than 5 options from which citizens can choose. Some 
countries (eg, Ireland) may be moving towards multiple payer 
systems.5 In low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), the 
debate on the financing side is centred more around financial 
protection and in the quest for universal coverage there are 
many possible configurations that involve competition to one 
degree or other.6 
The potential benefits of having competing insurers depend 
on key features of the healthcare market, including the 
degree to which insurers compete for customers – which in 
principle may drive down premiums; and also the degree 
to which they can influence the supply-side of the market – 
which may reduce prices and improve quality if the structure 
of the market incentivises purchaser pressure on providers. 
However, even amongst the less regulated markets, there is 
generally a degree of control and regulation exercised over 
(a) the level of premium that can be charged (or the factors 
governing differential charges made to specific groups); and 
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(b) the content of the benefits package (usually in terms of a 
minimum set of benefits).7 Regulation is aimed at guarding 
against market failure and, in the insurer market, factors 
related to imperfect information, moral hazard and adverse 
selection are particularly pertinent issues. 
Competition in the delivery of healthcare services is relevant 
to a much broader range of healthcare systems across the 
world, but what it means is also not always clear. First, it is 
not synonymous with private sector provision as it possible 
to create competitive conditions amongst public sector 
providers, hence the “internal market” created in the English 
National Health Service (NHS).8 In such systems, some of 
the potential benefits of competition (eg, sharper focus on 
costs and quality) were intended to flow from the fact that 
providers were competing for contracts from purchasers/
commissioners. Second, privately owned providers may 
be publically funded and may operate in competition with 
publically owned providers. Third, competition is not always 
purely price-based; for example, the introduction of fixed 
tariffs/prices in the NHS still allowed for competition on 
non-price aspects of care, as well as giving a greater role to 
consumers in stimulating competition via exercising choice 
over which provider they go to for some types of care. Fourth, 
the characteristics of many healthcare systems often inhibits 
the degree to which there can be competition in the market 
ie, with providers competing for patients; and instead it is 
often more about providers competing for the market (or 
making markets contestable) ie, trying to win the business of 
a commissioner where it is feasible to only have one or very 
few providers of a service, operating. In all such markets, 
regulation of providers will exist in some form or other and 
in the provider market issues related to the protection of 
citizens (eg, against price increases or quality skimping) as 
well as guarding against costly excess capacity or duplication 
in provision, are particularly pertinent.
A simple dichotomy between competitive and non-
competitive markets gets in the way of understanding the 
nuances of the reality of most healthcare systems which tend 
not to be at either end of these extremes. The complexity 
and diversity of competitive markets may be one reason 
why evidence on their impact, although plentiful, is often 
conflicting and non-generalisable beyond the specific 
context in which the evaluation has taken place, explaining 
perhaps why there are such diverse views on the role of 
competition. In addition, gathering reliable evidence on 
the impact of competition is hindered by the lack of robust 
evaluation frameworks when policies are implemented. 
Thus, the evidence relating to the English NHS which 
has, at various times seen elements mainly of supply-side 
competition introduced, is mixed, contested and likely 
applicable only in those countries with similar healthcare 
systems. For instance, the evidence relating to the later stages 
of the reforms (post 2000) is relevant to markets where prices 
are fixed by the regulator, and the main focus has been on 
whether competition in these circumstances has driven up 
quality. Studies that have strong methodological designs show 
that areas with greater competition had fewer deaths from 
myocardial infarction and hence are interpreted as a signal 
of improved quality.9,10 Reviews of the evidence from the 
period where there was both price and quality competition 
in the NHS, have suggested there is substantial evidence that 
there was either little effect on quality, or even that although 
observable quality measured by indicators such as waiting 
times, improved, non-observable measures such as hospital 
mortality rates, were adversely affected.11 Much of the 
evidence relating to price competition comes from the United 
States and whilst there is evidence to suggest that quality may 
indeed suffer under such a regime, hence the often held view 
that competition is “bad,” detailed reviews of the literature 
again reveal quite a mixed picture.12,13 It is particularly 
difficult to generalise to LMIC from the experience of 
competitive healthcare markets in Europe and the United 
States, for the very reason that the implementation is so 
specific to the healthcare systems. In LMIC, the debate has 
anyway often centred around the role of private ownership of 
providers, rather than competition per se, as private provision 
is very common in many parts of Africa and Asia.14 Again, 
the evidence on the benefits – in terms of a range of factors 
reflecting performance – of private versus public providers is 
rather mixed, with no firm conclusions drawn15,16; and with 
evidence suggesting that there are pros and cons of systems 
with predominantly public versus private systems, in LMICs.17 
However, although private ownership often goes hand in 
hand with a more market-based, competitive environment, 
it is not synonymous with competition as such markets can 
be highly regulated. In many LMICs in particular, regulation 
is often patchy in practice and has led some commentators 
to conclude that many of the market failures that may limit 
the role of competition in healthcare – most specifically, the 
lack of availability of information on quality and lack of 
managerial skills required – are often particularly apparent 
in LMIC.18 Others are more optimistic and see a greater 
potential role for market mechanisms in improving efficiency 
in developed and emerging economies, including competition 
between insurers and between providers.19 
This raises another important issue in the debate which is the 
mechanism by which competition may produce benefits in the 
context of healthcare. Much of the focus has been on the role 
of patients exercising choice about where they receive care, 
hence the argument is that, where they are not paying a direct 
price, they are responding to signals about non-price aspects 
of the services on offer, and hence their behaviour can drive 
up overall quality.20 This can only apply where patients have 
a direct choice of provider and where there is competition in 
the market – for example, elective care in the NHS system. 
Although some have argued that driving up the quality of 
one aspect of care offered by a provider, may also have a 
positive impact on the quality of the provider across the 
board,21 and indeed others have investigated improvements in 
“management quality” that arise due to competitive pressures, 
which potentially impact on all hospital activity.22 Otherwise, 
the mechanism works through the agents of patients 
(commissioners, insurers) exercising choice on their behalf 
and directing business (in the market or for the market) only 
to those who offer a service that is value for money in terms of 
price (where prices are not fixed) and/or quality. 
It is noticeable that the majority of the discussion and 
evidence about supply-side healthcare competition revolves 
around the hospital sector.13 Whilst such care is obviously a 
major element of healthcare provision, it may well be the case 
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that the conditions most amenable to competitive markets 
exist more often in other sectors such as community care, 
where there are potentially fewer concerns about issues 
such as economies of scale and high entry costs. Indeed, this 
highlights the key issue in considering the role of competition 
– the debate should be less about endlessly discussing 
whether it is “good” or “bad” and more about defining the 
circumstances under which it may work well and the nature 
of the barriers that arise in other contexts. The influencing 
factors are complex and varied, including issues related to the 
demand side, such as whether patients are willing to travel in 
order to receive a service; technical issues related to the costs 
of providing services, such as the existence of economies of 
scale and scope and the degree of spare capacity that can be 
tolerated; and the ease by which information about services 
and quality may be accessed and interpreted (by patients 
or by their agent). Some research has focused on defining 
a “competition feasibility framework” against which the 
potential for competition for a specific service may be tested.23 
Hence, a service such as community-based mental healthcare 
may exhibit characteristics that make it far more amenable 
to deriving benefits within a competitive environment, than 
provision of major trauma services, for instance. 
The position taken on the appropriateness of competition 
in healthcare is also a political and cultural matter which 
is linked to the values inherent in the healthcare systems 
of different countries. In some contexts, any amount of 
competition may be seen as “too much” and as a signal of 
creeping “privatisation” and of the dismantling of dearly loved 
public systems. In others, the introduction of competition is 
welcomed as a potential mechanism for improving efficiency 
and productivity and improving population health. The fact 
that competition can be viewed both as the “problem” and 
the “solution” is an indication of the crucial role of context in 
understanding the potential for market forces to improve the 
healthcare system.
Ethical issues
Not applicable.
Competing interests
Author declares that she has no competing interests.
 
Author’s contribution
MG is the single author of the manuscript.
References 
1. Pollock A, Macfarlane A, Kirkwood G, et al. No 
evidence that patient choice in the NHS saves lives. 
Lancet.    2011;378(9809):2057-2060. doi:10.1016/S0140-
6736(11)61553-5
2.	 Gaynor	M,	Moreno-Serra	R,	Propper	C.	Death	by	market	power:	
reform, competition, and patient outcomes in the National 
Health Service. Am Econ J Econ Policy. 2013;5(4):134-166.	
doi:10.1257/pol.5.4.134
3.	 Kessler	 DP,	 McClellan	 MB.	 Is	 hospital	 competition	
socially wasteful? Q J Econ. 2000;115(2):577-615.	
doi:10.1162/003355300554863
4.	 Arrow KJ. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical 
care. Am Econ Rev.	 1963;53(5):941-973.	
5. Mikkers	M,	Padhraig	R.	“Managed	competition”	for	Ireland?	The	
single versus multiple payer debate. BMC Health Serv Res. 
2014;14:442.	 doi:10.1186/1472-6963-14-442 
6. Mills	A.	Health	care	systems	in	low-	and	middle-income	countries.	
N Engl J Med.	2014;370:552-557.		doi:10.1056/NEJMra1110897 
7.	 Paris	 V,	 Devaux	 M,	 Wei	 L.	 Health Systems Institutional 
Characteristics: A Survey Of 29 OECD Countries. OECD 
Health Working Paper No. 50.	Paris:	OECD	Publishing;	2010.	
doi:10.1787/5kmfxfq9qbnr-en
8. Baggott	 R.	 Evaluating	 health	 care	 reform:	 the	 case	 of	 the	
NHS internal market. Public Adm.	 1997;75(2):283-306.	
doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00061
9. Cooper	 Z,	 Gibbons	 S,	 Jones	 S,	 McGuire	 A.	 Does	 hospital	
competition save lives? Evidence from the English NHS patient 
choice reforms. Econ J. 2011;121:F228-F260.	 doi:10.1111/
j.1468-0297.2011.02449.x
10.	 Gaynor	M,	Moreno-Serra	R,	Propper	C.	Death by Market Power: 
Reform, Competition and Patient Outcomes in the National 
Health Service. NBER Working Paper No. 16164. Cambridge, 
MA:	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research;	 2010.	
11. Bevan	 G,	 Skellern	 M.	 Does	 competition	 between	 hospitals	
improve	 clinical	 quality?	 A	 review	 of	 evidence	 from	 two	 eras	
of competition in the English NHS. BMJ.	 2011;343:d6470.	
doi:10.1136/bmj.d6470	
12.	 Gaynor	M,	Town	RJ.	Competition	 in	Health	Care	Markets.	 In:	
Pauly	 MV,	 Mcguire	 TG,	 Barro	 PP,	 eds.	 Handbook of Health 
Economics.	Vol	2.	Elsevier;	2011:499-637.	doi:10.1016/B978-0-
444-53592-4.00009-8 
13.	 OECD	 Report.	 Competition in Hospital Services. http://www.
oecd.org/daf/competition/50527122.pdf. Published 2012.
14.	 Forsberg BC, Montagu D, Sundewall J. Moving towards in-
depth knowledge on the private health sector in low-	 and 
middle-income countries. Health Policy Plan. 2011;26(1):i1-i3. 
doi:10.1093/heapol/czr050 
15. Hollingsworth	B.	The	measurement	of	efficiency	and	productivity	
of health care delivery. Health Econ. 2008;17(10):1107-1128.	
doi:10.1002/hec.1391 
16. Herrera	 CA,	 Rada	 G,	 Kuhn-Barrientos	 L,	 Barrios	 X.	 Does	
ownership matter? An overview of systematic reviews of the 
performance	 of	 private	 for-profit,	 private	 not-for-profit	 and	
public healthcare providers. PLoS One.	 2014;9(12):e93456.	
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093456 
17.	 Basu	S,	Andrews	J,	Kishore	S,	Panjabi	R,	Stuckler	D.	Comparative	
performance	 of	 private	 and	 public	 healthcare	 systems	 in	 low-	
and	middle-income	countries:	a	systematic	review.	PLoS Med. 
2012;9(6):e1001244.	 doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001244 
18. Broomberg	 J.	Managing	 the	 health	 care	market	 in	 developing	
countries:	 prospects	 and	 problems.	 Health Policy Plan. 
1994;9(3):237-251. doi:10.1093/heapol/9.3.237	
19. International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF).	 Macro-Fiscal Implications 
of Health Care Reform in Advanced and Emerging Economies. 
Washington:	 International	Monetary	 Fund;	 2010.	
20.	 Le	Grand	J.	The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services 
through Choice and Competition.	 Princeton,	 NJ:	 Princeton	
University	 Press;	 2007.	
21.	 Propper C. Competition, incentives and the English NHS. Health 
Econ.	2012;21(1):33-40.	doi:10.1002/hec.1804 
22.	 Bloom	 N,	 Propper	 C,	 Seiler	 S,	 Van	 Reenen	 J.	 the	 impact	 of	
competition	 on	 management	 quality:	 evidence	 from	 public	
hospitals. Rev Econ Stud.	2015;82(2):457-489.	 doi:10.1093/
restud/rdu045	
23.	 Office	 of	 Health	 Economics	 (OHE).	 Competition in the NHS. 
Report of the office of health economics commission.	London:	
Office	 of	 Health	 Economics;	 2012.	
